

# **Defining Doctrine for Transitions, a Case Study in Post-MCO Security**

**A Monograph  
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**AY 04-05**



<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved</i> <b>OMB No. 074-0188</b>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503				
<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</b>	<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> 28 April 2005	<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> Monograph July 2004-April 2005		
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Defining Doctrine for Transition, a Case Study in Establishing Secure Environments		<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b> PR		
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> David L. Raugh				
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> US Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027		<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027		<b>10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>				
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b> A	
<b>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)</b> <p>Phase III Operation Iraqi Freedom has shown our military's propensity to focus on major combat operations (MCO) often at the expense of post-MCO security and reconstruction. Without clear doctrinal guidance of how to establish effective security in a post-MCO environment, small unit leaders are forced to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures on the spot, thus leaving little time to plan and procure the recourses and measures necessary to establish a fully secure environment. This monograph examines what basic security requirements are necessary to effectively transition from a MCO to a post-MCO environment.</p> <p>Historical analysis can greatly assist in identifying positive and negative trends in post-MCO environments across the political, military, social, economic, infrastructure, and information spectrum. Specifically, Post WW II Germany and Japan, Panama and Kosovo show trends that are inevitable, but can be leveraged if foreseen and prepared for.</p> <p>The trends identified through historical analysis can then be compared to existing US Army doctrine to see if they indeed can affect these trends in a favorable way. Detailed examination identifies gaps between post-MCO requirements and current security doctrine. A security framework addressing these shortfalls provides an effective construct for additional doctrinal research. This monograph recommends specific additions to the current US Army doctrine that can easily implemented</p>				
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Security, Post-MCO, Army Doctrine			<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 51	
			<b>16. PRICE CODE</b>	
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> U	<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> U	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> U	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> none	



# **SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES**

## **MONOGRAPH APPROVAL**

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Title of Monograph: Defining Doctrine for Transitions, a Case Study in Post-MCO  
Security

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## **Abstract**

DEFINING DOCTRINE FOR TRANSITION, A CASE STUDY IN POST-MCO SECURITY,  
By Major David L. Raugh, United States Army, 51 pages.

Phase III Operation Iraqi Freedom has shown our military's propensity to focus on major combat operations (MCO) often at the expense of post-MCO security and reconstruction. Without clear doctrinal guidance of how to establish effective security in a post-MCO environment, small unit leaders are forced to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures on the spot, thus leaving little time to plan and procure the resources and measures necessary to establish a fully secure environment. This monograph examines what basic security requirements are necessary to effectively transition from a MCO to a post-MCO environment.

A post-MCO environment is a complex environment requiring immediate attention and assistance. Successfully winning the peace and convincing the indigenous population that US and Allied forces are victorious is greatly dependant on the US ability to provide security, promote law and order, restore services, and allow the population to return to work and provide for their families. Political and military understanding of these requirements are paramount to the success of the operation. In most cases, MCO security tasks differ significantly from post-MCO security tasks.

Historical analysis can greatly assist in identifying positive and negative trends in post-MCO environments across the political, military, social, economic, infrastructure, and information spectrum. Specifically, Post WW II Germany and Japan, Panama and Kosovo show trends that are inevitable, but can be leveraged if foreseen and prepared for.

The trends identified through historical analysis can then be compared to existing US Army doctrine to see if they indeed can affect these trends in a favorable way. Detailed examination identifies gaps between post-MCO requirements and current security doctrine. A security framework addressing these shortfalls provides an effective construct for additional doctrinal research. This monograph recommends specific additions to the current US Army doctrine that can easily implemented.

Monograph authors must avoid writing a physical description of the paper instead of a brief summary. For example, do not write, " This monograph has three sections. Section one introduces the topic and discusses the methodology. Section two is a brief history of the problem . . ." An abstract written in that manner requires a researcher to read the entire monograph to discover whether it is relevant to his own topic.



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## Introduction

Take up the White Man's burden--  
The savage wars of peace--  
Fill full the mouth of Famine,  
And bid the sickness cease;  
And when your goal is nearest  
(The end for others sought)  
Watch sloth and heathen folly  
Bring all your hope to nought.<sup>1</sup>

Rudyard Kipling

In October 1901, during the Philippine War, a battalion of 315 US Marines, under the command of Major Littleton Waller Tazewell Waller received instruction on the pacification of Samar, a providence of the Philippine islands. Brigadier General “Hell-Roaring Jake” Smith, US Army commander of the 6<sup>th</sup> Separate Brigade, told him “I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and the more you burn the better you will please me.” He added, “I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms.”<sup>2</sup>

Operations of this type, though effective in the short term in protecting the occupying force, are no longer morally, lawfully, or politically acceptable. As described by Marina Ottaway, “often, the first step colonial powers took when engaging in nation building was pacification, invariably a bloody undertaking...In today's gentler world of nation building, such violent means are fortunately unacceptable. Instead, peacemakers usually try to mediate agreements among rival factions, demobilize combatants, and then reintegrate them in civilian life- a theoretically good idea that rarely works in practice.”<sup>3</sup> Nations or coalitions that intervene to stabilize a failing state, prevent further conflict, or support regional or global security

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<sup>1</sup> Rudyard Kipling, *White Man's Burden*. The Literature Network, 2004. Database on-line. Available from <http://www.online-literature.com/kipling/922/>. Accessed 24 SEP 2004; Internet.

<sup>2</sup> Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 120.

<sup>3</sup> Marina Ottaway, "Nation Building," *Foreign Policy*, no.132 (September/October 2002): 20.



objectives must strive for a solution which benefits both the intervening force, and the populace of the state itself. They must wield all aspects of strategic power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic effectively to find a satisfactory solution to conflict.

From a US Army perspective, it is difficult to transition an environment of violence and destruction to that of law and order. According to Scott R. Feil “post conflict situations, by definition, have at their core a significant security vacuum that is often the proximate cause for external intervention. Indigenous security institutions are either unable to provide security or are operating outside generally accepted norms (i.e. corruption, as in Panama; abuse of power, as in the Balkans).”<sup>4</sup> These norms, which American forces often assume are standard throughout the world, in fact may differ significantly due to cultural, economic, or civic differences.

US conventional wisdom states that transition and reconstruction activities can begin only upon termination of MCO and the establishment of a secure environment. This perspective is from that of the invading, intervening or occupying force (a “Blue” perspective). From a “Red” perspective, former regime-members, guerrillas, terrorist organizations, or disenfranchised members of the populace may see the termination of MCO as an opportunity to begin an insurgency movement; thereby taking advantage of the security vacuum to establish their power base or force early withdrawal of US and coalition forces. Doomed regimes or organizations may plan post-MCO activities to sabotage public infrastructure and conduct terror attacks against the general populace as well as US and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO). These actions incite misery in the population as well as doubt in the occupying force’s ability to maintain control and provide the population’s basic necessities for survival.

Many pundits claim that the current insurgency in Iraq is a result of a significant security and basic-needs vacuum following Phase III Operation Iraqi Freedom. Relief organizations and civilian agencies, which provide much to relieve suffering and reestablish basic human needs,

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<sup>4</sup>Feil, Scott. “Building Better Foundation: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction,” *Washington Quarterly* 22 (Autumn 2002): 97-98



often will not participate until local or regional security has been established and their activities are safeguarded. The populace, though possibly relieved to see the end of high intensity conflict, will grow increasingly discouraged if their homes, business and families are threatened by lawlessness, disorder and if basic services (water, electricity, transportation) are not quickly restored. Additionally, according to Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, the US Army has a tendency to focus “predominantly on winning wars, not on the peacekeeping or nation building that comes afterwards.” They add that “national objectives can often be accomplished only after the fighting has ceased; a war tactically and operationally “won” can still lead to strategic “loss” if post-conflict operations are poorly planned or executed.”<sup>5</sup> Because of these and many other considerations, conventional US Army and other forces must develop transitional security solutions to address how to quickly secure a region in order to allow stability and reconstruction activities to begin, even as MCO operations may continue elsewhere in the area of operation.

Four sections of this paper address this topic. The first section addresses the research question, provides background and justification as well as bounds the problem by providing scope and limitations. Section two provides a historical perspective of post-MCO security operations beginning with the termination of World War Two. It analyzes the following operations: post-war occupation of Germany and Japan, Operation Just Cause and Promote Liberty (Panama) and Operation Joint Guardian (Kosovo). This investigation identifies actions, trends and effects created by the environment and military forces that conducted the operations. Section three reviews current US Army doctrine and the doctrine development process. Section four contains conclusions and recommendations for a security framework as discussed in this paper.

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<sup>5</sup> Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 2.



## **Statement of the Problem**

The primary research question is: does US Army doctrine clearly define the conduct of security operations following major combat operations? The purpose of this paper is to provide the operational and tactical commander with an approach to manage the complexity of post-MCO security operations. It provides the reader with a graduated framework, based upon Operational Net Assessment (ONA) and Effects Based Operations (EBO), which can be applied in such an environment and provide a common security starting point.

## **Background**

Post-MCO security operations have occurred throughout history. Within the last 20 years, the US has experienced such an environment multiple times. Recent operations range from fully conventional operations (Operation Iraqi Freedom) to those fought primarily with Special Operations and Joint assets (Operation Enduring Freedom). Post-MCO operations range from relatively small scale (Operation Just Cause and Urgent Fury) to large scale (Operation Desert Storm). Military operations will most likely continue at a greater rate in the near future. The increase will occur for several reasons. Attacks on the US on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 have resulted in a significant change to its national and military security strategy. President George W. Bush now openly states that the US reserves the right to use all elements of national power pre-emptively and unilaterally if necessary in an effort to win the Global War on Terror. President Bush espoused this view in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002 when he stated, "We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be



unavoidable.”<sup>6</sup> His statement shows an increased willingness to use military power in conjunction with, or possibly in lieu of, diplomatic, economic, or informational leverages after these other measures have been exhausted. Also, the US National Security Strategy stresses the importance of promoting global free-trade and democratic ideals, thus increasing the possibility of not only intervention, but also the importance of securing, stabilizing and improving the economic and political infrastructures of failing and failed states in an effort to promote a world friendly to the strategic interests of the United States<sup>7</sup>. Additionally, the US has an increased responsibility to serve as a law-enforcing hegemony throughout the world due to proliferation of non-state actors and terrorist organizations, as well as real or possible weapons of mass destruction.

## Scope and Limitations

This monograph addresses post-MCO security operations and US Army doctrine using elements of Effects Based Operations (EBO) as evaluation criteria. Specifically it uses operational net assessment (ONA), or “the integration of people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build shared knowledge of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves.”<sup>8</sup> This paper uses ONA to identify aspects of the post-MCO environment, the threat, and US Army capabilities that can be leveraged to produce intended effects, and make reconstruction a success. These specific aspects or systems are divided into political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMSEII).<sup>9</sup> The monograph will use PMSEII to frame aspects of the historical case studies and to establish a security framework in the conclusion and recommendations.

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<sup>6</sup> President’s remarks at the UN General Assembly 12 SEP 2002 from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html> accessed 1 DEC 2004

<sup>7</sup> National Security Strategy of the United States, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, Chapter 3 and 6, accessed 29 SEP 2004.

<sup>8</sup> The United States Joint Forces Command. *Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 4, Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment (ONA)*. (Suffolk: Joint Warfighting Center, 24 FEB 2004), 39.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 9.



There are four main limitations. First, this study is limited to US Army doctrine only. Historically, US Army forces have formed the majority of land forces committed to MCOs and subsequent operations. More often than not, Army force (ARFOR) or land component (LCC) commanders are supported commanders in campaign plans that include post-MCO operations.

Secondly, this study attempts to develop a framework that applies to scenarios of both an accepted term MCO and a scenario where the settlement of the MCO is challenged or unresolved. Examples of an accepted term MCO is WW II Japan, where the accepted representative of Japan (Emperor Hirohito) agreed to the details of the armistice and his nation as a whole accepted their defeat. Iraq exemplifies a challenged MCO. No officially recognized representative of the former regime accepted defeat and the subsequent occupation of the nation continues to be resisted by indigenous forces. While the topic of accepting defeat could be the subject of other monographs, this study will not address it. Additionally, while most of the case studies cited in this monograph are viewed as accepted term MCOs when viewed in hindsight, this monograph promulgates the idea that shrinking or removing the security vacuum so common in a post-MCO environment can greatly increase the indigenous population's acceptance of an occupation.

Third, this study focuses primarily on MCO and post-MCO conflict interventions versus interventions conducted primarily for humanitarian purposes or in response to natural disasters. In humanitarian interventions, security, while important, is not the general over-riding task or principle for intervening military forces.<sup>10</sup>

Lastly, this paper is limited to providing only a basic framework for Post-MCO security operations. Time and research restraints limit the depth of this study. Instead, this monograph will show limitations in current US Army doctrine and provide direction for future research into this subject.

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<sup>10</sup> Scott Feil, "Building Better Foundation: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction." *Washington Quarterly* 22 (Autumn 2002): 98.



## **Post-MCO Case Study Examination and Analysis**

This section focuses on detailed examination of four historical scenarios in which US Military forces participated in MCO operations followed by a transition and reconstruction period. Three of these scenarios (Germany, Japan, Panama) involved US ground and air combat as part of MCO and one (Kosovo) involved only air combat prior to intervention. In each case, the section begin with a brief background and description of events leading into the post-MCO operations, followed by a description of the security tasks/ effects undertaken, and then an examination of how these tasks/ effects unfolded in execution. Each case study concludes with an examination of the specific PMSEII attributes, summarizes the plan, identifies the level of planning and coordination prior to implementation and identifies issues during its implementation. To aid the reader, a summary of the post-MCO plan, level of planning and coordination, and issues for each scenario are contained in Appendix A.

### **Post WW II Germany**

#### **Background**

Early in the World War II, Allied leaders saw the need to begin planning the post-combat governance and occupation of Germany. Members of the US State Department wished to avoid results similar to the WW I armistice, peace treaty and subsequent resurgence of aggression in Germany. In early 1941, the State Department established the Division of Special Research (SR). This agency conducted initial analysis in defining surrender terms and considering alternatives in post-war occupation and governance of Germany, Italy and subsequently Japan.<sup>11</sup> In spring of 1942, the US established the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia. This institution melded civilian intellectuals, US interagency, and military personnel in studying the

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<sup>11</sup> Marlene Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952*, ed. Robert Wolfe. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1984), 7.



intricacies of post-war governance.<sup>12</sup> In January 1943, President Roosevelt, with agreement of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, announced that the Allies would only accept “unconditional surrender” of the Axis powers, adding “[this] does not mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it does mean the destruction of the philosophies in these countries which are based on conquest and subjugation of other people.”<sup>13</sup> Planners quickly realized the difficulty in how to effectively change a nation’s philosophy yet still retain social and economic viability. In the end, they realized the most effective way was through a military government with interagency assistance.

In October 1944, The US Joint Chiefs of Staff published JCS 1067, which provided guidance to General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, on the occupation and governance of Germany<sup>14</sup>. His plan, named Operation ECLIPSE, called for rapid movement “to secure especially important strategic areas deep inside Germany” followed by “disarmament of German forces, enforcement of surrender terms, establishment of law and order, and redistribution of Allied forces into designated national zones of occupation.”<sup>15</sup> The specific security tasks/ effects identified by Allied planners in Operation ECLIPSE to support post-MCO operations and governance were defined as: disarming and demobilizing the German army; identifying, capturing and prosecuting war criminals; preventing guerrilla attacks on friendly forces and military governments; maintaining a robust security presence throughout the country; conducting border control; providing internal law enforcement; and training a new German police force.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Crane and Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, 13.

<sup>13</sup> Mayo, “American Wartime Planning For Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts,” 9.

<sup>14</sup> Kenneth O. McCreedy, “Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany” (SAMS Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 19

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 24

<sup>16</sup> James Dobbins, John McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, Anga Timilsina. *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 4-11.



## Execution

In execution, Allied armies had difficulty in defining when Operation Overlord (defeat of Nazi Germany) ended and Operation ECLIPSE (its subsequent occupation) began. General Eisenhower had the authority to declare the “A-day” to initiate ECLIPSE and originally intended to declare the termination of OVERLORD and the start of ECLIPSE upon the formal capitulation of Germany. However, instead of a formal surrender of the entire nation, local German commanders surrendered piecemeal as Allied forces continued to advance into Germany.<sup>17</sup> Recognizing this, Eisenhower granted subordinate Army Group Commanders the authority to “implement provisions of the ECLIPSE plan, especially those related to treatment of displaced persons, disarmament of German armed forces, and establishment of military government[s].”<sup>18</sup> In many cases, subordinate commanders had already implemented aspects of ECLIPSE well before receipt of the official SHAEF directive.

On 8 May 1945, Germany formally capitulated to Allied forces. The US, British, French, and Soviet Union established military governments in zones for governance. In the US zone, military government detachments were sent to each town. Their security demands to the occupants included (but were not limited to) providing a list of local soldier and Nazi party members, the turn-in of all firearms, and the provision of housing for American troops. Detachments also established curfews and replaced uncooperative mayors.<sup>19</sup> As time went on, the US modified their occupation policy. On VE day, the US had 61 Divisions in Europe. Pressure from the US public to reduce troop levels and bring her soldiers home led to the reduction of occupation levels to 5 divisions and establishment of US Constabulary.<sup>20</sup> The US

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<sup>17</sup> McCreedy, “Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany”, 32

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>19</sup> Crane and Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq*, 14.

<sup>20</sup> Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal, Swanger, Timilsina. *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 9.



Constabulary, numbering 31,000 troops by 1946, was designed to act as police force until the German police force was reestablished.

## Lessons learned

Using the Operational Net Assessment (ONA) to evaluate the environment and lessons learned in post-MCO operations, the PMSEII components of political, military, social and economic/infrastructure stand out as significant in post- WWII Germany.

Under the political component, JCS 1067 laid out clear principles for the denazification of Germany. These principles included “dismantling the political and legal structures that the Nazi Party had created in Germany, arresting and punishing Nazi leaders and supporters, and excluding active Nazis from public life.”<sup>21</sup> National level Nazi leaders were quickly captured and subsequently tried in the Nuremburg tribunal in 1945-46. Additionally, to punish lower level Nazi officials, US forces established tribunals at the lower levels, run by local German administration, under supervision from occupying American forces and officials. US government officials also had the power to immediately remove complacent or resistant German local officials. In all of these cases, however, they found that the original intent to remove and punish all Nazi party members was unrealistic, due to the large numbers of party members and the lack of competent non-party Germans required for administrative duties. Concessions were made to allow local military governments to screen and select appropriate German personnel for administrative and government positions. In the long run this led to a quicker acceptance of occupation rule and prevention of resistance or splinter groups calling for the return of Nazi rule to Germany.

In the military component, there was much less compromise. Anticipated long-term resistance from hard-core Nazis and guerrillas proved unfounded in the period following German

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid, 13.



capitulation. The large presence of occupation forces, numbering 1.6 million men, immediately following MCO allowed American forces to search, find and capture die-hard resisters in a timely and efficient manner. American troops rapidly demobilized German military and police and required Germans to turn in all weapons, civilian and military. US military governance thus quickly established the unquestioned authority of American occupiers throughout Germany.

From a social and informational component aspect, the US Constabulary proved highly effective in security operations. As troop levels quickly dropped, US forces identified the need for an established police force to fill the security void until the new German police force was adequately trained and equipped. The subsequent creation of a US Constabulary filled that law and order void. It was trained as a mobile reserve force that could respond to incidents of civil unrest, conduct mounted and dismounted patrols, interdict smuggling operations, and assist in intelligence gathering.<sup>22</sup> Its ability to prevent black-market activities, protect citizenry property from theft and destruction, and quickly disseminate information to the populace proved invaluable to the reconstruction of Germany.

In the areas of economic/infrastructure components, the US military provided surplus military equipment and supplies to German civilians and displaced civilians as well as provided security and assistance to NGO organizations such as the Red Cross. As forces transitioned to Operation ECLIPSE, US forces moved quickly to secure factories, warehouses, mines, and transportation hubs. Unfortunately, much economic and government infrastructure was destroyed by the strategic bombing campaign pursued by Allied air forces. Security was paramount on still-standing infrastructure due to the large number of displaced civilians seeking supplies, and in some cases retribution against their German jailers. Some secured factories were dismantled and transported to Russia and France as part of the post-war reparation plan. This widespread destruction of infrastructure due to bombing and the demobilization of German military forces led

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 10.



to huge numbers of unemployed men throughout the nation. Local military governments used available funds to pay them for reconstruction labor, however, significant economic hardship endured in Germany well after the war, resulting in the implementation of the Marshall Plan in 1948.

## Post WW II Japan

### Background

Planning for occupation of Japan unfolded similar to Germany. The primary difference was that “it remained primarily American in conceptualization and implementation.”<sup>23</sup> General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP), received draft guidance for post-war occupation of Japan in August 1945. He received additional guidance from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), a Department of State-led committee, in the form of policy guides on “such diverse topics as disarmament, war crimes, censorship, media control, education, reorientation, governmental reform, the institution of the emperor, industry and trade, and agriculture and labor.”<sup>24</sup> His final guidance, approved by President Truman, arrived a week after the official Japanese surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay.

At surrender, Japan had approximately 4 million soldiers originally prepared to defend the Island of Japan as well as another 3.5 million spread over the Pacific Rim.<sup>25</sup> On the Island of Japan proper, the US was leader in occupation duties. There were no zones or separate responsibilities for other Allied nations.<sup>26</sup> Due to force conservation and social considerations, there was no military government apparatus such as what was set up in Germany. Instead, American and Allied intellectuals and members of the US Department of State envisioned a

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<sup>23</sup> Mayo, “American Wartime Planning For Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts,” 3.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>25</sup> Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal, Swanger, Timilsina. *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 26.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 28.



purged Japanese government, led by their Emperor Hirohito. As stated by Hugh Borton, a member of the State Departments Division of Special Research (SR), “all my readings and contacts in the Japanese field led me to the firm conviction that the monarchy can be used as a strong element of unity around which liberal Democratic elements can govern Japan...any nation or group of nations which forced the overthrow of the monarchy within Japan would arouse violent animosity from the ordinary citizens.”<sup>27</sup> Thus MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) was responsible for both military occupation and supervising the new Japanese government.<sup>28</sup>

The security tasks delegated to MacArthur included demobilization and disarmament of the 7 million man Japanese military, and their reintegration into civilian society; disbanding paramilitary and ultranationalist organizations; providing oversight and surveillance of a Japanese run demobilization and disarmament campaign. Later guidance directed SCAP to assist in establishing a national police reserve, a paramilitary force of up to 75,000.<sup>29</sup>

## Execution

Soon after the acceptance of the Japanese surrender, General MacArthur occupied Japan with approximately 200,000 US and British soldiers. Using existing Japanese government infrastructure, MacArthur utilized military-resourced "military government" teams (later renamed civil affairs teams) to supervise existing local governmental implementation of US military mandated actions. These teams occupied 46 prefectures throughout Japan.<sup>30</sup> Conventional US combat troops were garrisoned throughout the country but generally occupied towns, cities, and built up areas. Security operations for these occupying troops were easy since the Japanese

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<sup>27</sup> Hugh Borton in article to Fortune Magazine MAY 1942, pg. 16 *American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan*, Marlene J. Mayo.

<sup>28</sup> Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal, Swanger, Timilsina. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 30.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 34-35.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 30.



administrators, in the same way as the Emperor, encouraged acceptance of Allied occupiers. Additionally, most Japanese, weary of war, suffered from the “*kyodatsu* condition,” or an overwhelming sense of psychic exhaustion and despair.<sup>31</sup> Some die-hard Japanese resisters who occupied sparsely populated areas in the mountains of Japan were not captured, but simply isolated until they succumbed to starvation or capitulated to the American occupation. Most of the existing infrastructure was destroyed due to heavy US bombing, thus much of the security responsibility was directed initially toward demobilization of the Japanese military and police force. Disarmament policies resulted in the collection and destruction of millions of tons of military equipment and weaponry. Japanese military personnel greatly assisted the demobilization. Many units turned in their weapons, assisted in locating and destroying other weapon stockpiles, and subsequently returned to civilian life. By 1946, Japan was completely demobilized and disarmed.

MacArthur originally envisioned using captured military stockpiles of supplies to supplement humanitarian and economic operations throughout the nation. However, two weeks before the occupation of Japan by Allied forces, Emperor Hirohito conducted a statewide radio broadcast that called for nationwide acceptance of defeat and occupation by Allied forces. In that intervening period, “military officers and civilian bureaucrats throughout the country threw themselves frenetically into the task of ...disbursing vast hoards of military supplies in illicit ways.”<sup>32</sup> The subsequent suffering of homeless and hungry Japanese called for a massive humanitarian and economic effort on the part of America that continued through 1949. In spite of this assistance, black-markets predominated throughout most of Japan as late as 1952. While the military supported the majority of humanitarian relief in Japan, they also provided security and transportation for relief organizations such as the Red Cross.

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<sup>31</sup> John W. Dower *Embracing Defeat* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 88-89.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, 39.



US recognition of the Soviet Union as a threat and the spread of Communism in the Pacific and Eastern Asia led to occupation forces assisting in the training, equipping, and establishment of a 75,000 man National Police Reserve. Subsequent deployments of American occupation divisions to the Korean War later led to the US granting the independence of Japan and their establishment of a 300,000 man Army.

## Security Lessons Learned

Using the Operational Net Assessment (ONA) to evaluate the environment and lessons learned in post-MCO operations, the PMSEII components of political/social, military, economic, information and infrastructure stand out as significant in post- WWII Japan.

Under the political and social component aspect, Japan surrendered unconditionally, and the world acknowledged the necessity of Japan's occupation. The choice by US and Allied decision makers to retain the Emperor as the political figurehead, as well as subordinate government officials, allowed a largely peaceful post-MCO transition to reconstruction. The Emperor's repudiation of the militaristic mind-set that dominated the social construct of Japan for almost 15 years, his acceptance by the population and a culture that did not feature ethnic, tribal, religious divisions all led to a very successful (albeit long) occupation with significantly reduced Allied security requirements.<sup>33</sup>

Two lessons learned fall into the component of military. First, the Japanese military greatly assisted with their own demobilization. Their discipline, organization and cohesion made them a useful asset early in the occupation. Unfortunately, their perceived threat to resurgence of militaristic values quickly led to their demise. The subsequent addition of several million unemployed men to the populace created even greater economic stress on an already stressed economy. The second military lesson learned is the successful isolation of die-hard Japanese.

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<sup>33</sup> Crane and Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq*, 15-16.



Rather than conducting potentially dangerous and manpower intensive operations to search for and capture these resistors, Allied forces isolated guerrilla strong points resulting in their eventual surrender.

Two lessons fall into the components of economic and infrastructure. Japanese military and bureaucrats looted millions of tons of supplies before Allied forces could secure the military warehouses. If American troops had located and secured these stores immediately following Japan's defeat, it would have greatly assisted subsequent humanitarian operations and helped to prevent illegal black markets. Secondly, US military forces quickly secured existing local government infrastructure from loss and theft. This infrastructure quickly housed the newly purged Japanese government with little additional resourcing.

Lastly, under the information component, Japanese acceptance of defeat was a key aspect of successful post-MCO security. Emperor Hirohito's statewide radio address, two weeks prior to the official Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay, called for acceptance of defeat and subsequent Allied occupation.

## **Panama**

### **Background**

Planning for the invasion of Panama began in February of 1988. That month two Florida grand juries indicted General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the Commander-in-Chief of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) on drug-trafficking charges. Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle attempted to quietly remove Noriega from his position of commander in chief of the PDF. Delvalle was subsequently impeached by the Noriega-controlled legislative assembly who declared Manuel Soolis Palma, a Noriega-controlled crony, as his successor.<sup>34</sup> At that time the JCS ordered US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to begin contingency planning for the

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<sup>34</sup>Fishel, John T., *Civil Military Operations in the New World* (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 21-22.



commitment of US forces to Panama. Noriega's subsequent annulment of the May 1989 national elections, the PDF killing of Marine Lieutenant Robert Paz and the harassment of a US Navy Lieutenant and his wife continued to set the stage for intervention.<sup>35</sup> Operation NIMROD DANCER, a show of force, used as an opportunity to stage invasion forces within the country was followed shortly by Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama on 20 December 1989.<sup>36</sup>

The SOUTHCOM Post-MCO plan, then doctrinally described only as a civil-military operations (CMO) plan, directed the post invasion re-establishment of Panamanian government and governmental services. This plan was originally code-named BLIND LOGIC and later changed to PROMOTE LIBERTY. Planning for Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY was far from complete when hostilities began.<sup>37</sup> The focus on the tactical situation and execution of MCO led to little focus on the planning for post-conflict operations by XVIII ABN Corps, the ground component Task Force Headquarters.

Assigned security tasks to accomplish during transition operations included: capture Manuel Noriega, protect US lives and facilities, establish and maintain law and order, secure public health/ administration, economic infrastructure, secure the newly installed government of Panama.

## Execution

In most cases, the military MCO objectives were accomplished within 12-24 hours. The primary exception to this was the capture of Manuel Noriega, who was not captured until January 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1990. While the MCO operations were extremely effective, post-MCO operations were poorly planned, coordinated or executed. Following the invasion, widespread looting was rampant. While often inevitable in an invasion-type scenario, the damage here was significant.

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 23-24.

<sup>36</sup> Crane and Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq*, 3-4.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 4.



Rioters, often led by members of Noriega's Dignity battalions, vandalized and stole throughout the nation. In Panama City alone, the losses were evaluated at over \$1 Billion dollars.<sup>38</sup> Additionally, escaped prisoners ran rampant through the town, weapon caches were everywhere, and the newly established President and Vice-Presidents of Panama were attacked. In a quest to protect their property, business owners and residents formed neighborhood watch groups and often carried out vigilante-type justice to protect their property.<sup>39</sup>

Indigenous police forces were gone, either killed or hiding after the invasion. Police infrastructure such as police stations, jails, police cars and dispatch stations were destroyed in the rioting.<sup>40</sup> Conventional US forces attempted to establish law and order, but were untrained in police or MP-type activities other than areas security; US MP units were completely overwhelmed by assigned tasks in the post-MCO environment. For example, one XVIII Airborne Corps MP Battalion was responsible for running a detention facility, providing convoy security (for both US and NGO relief assets), providing area security for key infrastructure and providing law and order throughout the AO. This over tasking quickly led to them being overwhelmed.<sup>41</sup>

JTF Commanders quickly realized that drastic security measures must be taken. Two primary reasons led them to this conclusion. First, the newly installed government would have no credibility if they could not maintain law and order and protect the populace and their property from theft or destruction. Second, Panamanian economic infrastructure such as goods, services, and tourism and political infrastructure such as governmental buildings was in danger of destruction by angry mobs and rogue PDF diehards.

They decided to retain and retrain members of the PDF into a new police force. They felt this course of action would prevent a lengthy occupation by US Forces, which would question the

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<sup>38</sup> John Fishel and Richard D. Downie "Taking Responsibility for Our Actions? Establishing Order and Stability in Panama." (*Military Review* 72 (Apr 92)) 66.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 66.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 67.

<sup>41</sup> Crane and Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq*, 4.



legitimacy of the new government and keep 13,000 men with military training from becoming a disenfranchised opposition group.<sup>42</sup> Subsequently, the US Forces Liaison Group (USFLG), a unit with special forces/civil affairs capability, and the US Department of Justice International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), an organization used to train foreign police forces to fight drug cartels and terrorism, were brought in to oversee and train the new police force.<sup>43</sup> Subsequent purges, training, procurement of uniforms and equipment eventually resulted in a relatively secure environment resulting in the bulk of the US invasion forces redeploying less than two months from the invasion.

## Security Lessons Learned

Using the Operational Net Assessment (ONA) to evaluate the environment and lessons learned in post-MCO operations, the PMSEII components of political, military, social, informational, infrastructure and economy stand out as significant in post-MCO Panama.

From a political component aspect, it was very clear in Panama that the legitimacy of new government is questioned if they are unable to maintain law and order. Thus to support this political objective, conventional US forces, as well as US assistance organizations took risks and trained a rather dubious organization, the PDF, to provide internal security. Social and informational aspects apply also in America's dealing with the PDF. Socially, the Panamanian populace viewed the PDF as thugs and Noriega henchmen. Legitimacy of these forces was important if they were to provide a safe and secure environment upon the departure of US forces. Joint US/PDF patrols, uniforms of a different style and color from their former PDF BDUs<sup>44</sup>, the attempt to instill a "protect and serve" mentality<sup>45</sup>, as well as a vigorous information operation

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<sup>42</sup>Fishel and Downie "Taking Responsibility for Our Actions? Establishing Order and Stability in Panama." 67.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 69.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 71.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 73.



(IO) plan to the populace all were efforts to promote the new Panamanian Police Force as the rightful peacekeepers and law enforcers in Panama.

Within the military component, many conventional US combat forces were intimidated at the thought of executing “SASO” type operations. Surprisingly, although not officially trained on stability and support operations, most conventional units were effective at security and stability operations due to “small unit know-how.” Junior leaders, thrown into unclear, ambiguous, and confusing scenarios after post-MCO operations, took combat doctrine, applied the current situation, and added some common sense to figure out the best solution.

Infrastructure component lessons learned were important. American units were not assigned post-MCO responsibility to secure Panamanian security infrastructure (police stations, prisons, courts). This lack of security, and populace striking back against the symbols of a corrupt police force, led to massive destruction of the Panamanian internal security infrastructure. Fleeing PDF prison guards also released thousands of Panamanian prisoners, who subsequently took up arms and spread mayhem throughout the nation. The eventual reconstruction of the Panamanian Police Force was hampered by this destruction, requiring massive aid and grants from thus as well as a long lead-time before they were capable of independent operations.

An economic component was that lack of a police force could quickly lead to wanton destruction. While US forces secured hospitals, many governmental institutions and US facilities, they failed to effectively provide area security in the highly economic centers of large cities. The resulting looting and massive destruction of economic infrastructure led to rise of black-market activities, the requirement for extensive economic aid from the US, and a significant recession in the Panamanian nation for the next 5 years. Additionally, the vigilante-type justice meted out by property owners in the attempt to protect their own property added to the lack of legitimate order. US troops, were unable to identify armed looters from concerned property owners, and often applied harsh measures to both in an effort to quell the violence.



## Kosovo

### Background

In 1989 Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Yugoslavia, revoked Kosovo's autonomous status, and instead imposed direct control from Belgrade. Albanians holding positions within local government were removed and replaced with Serbs.<sup>46</sup> Over the next few years Yugoslavia disintegrated. In Kosovo, Albanian separatists formed the Kosovo Liberation Army, attempting to resist Serbian oppression and gain autonomy for Kosovo. Serbian efforts to quell this insurgency led to much bloodshed and dislocation of civilian to the point that the world community got involved to prevent genocide.<sup>47</sup> In June 1998, members of NATO began considering actions to force Milosevic to comply with UNSCR 1199. This resolution, among other things, expressed deep concern about the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army, and called for a cease-fire by both parties to the conflict.<sup>48</sup> A NATO resourced and UN supported contact team tasked with ensuring compliance to the security council resolution, withdrew from Kosovo following the breakdown of Albanian-Serb talks and thinly-veiled aggression from Serb forces.<sup>49</sup> On 23 March 1999, NATO commenced Operation ALLIED FORCE, a NATO bombing campaign that lasted a total of 77 days.<sup>50</sup> Milosevic eventually acceptance a NATO Military Technical Agreement (MTO) requiring the full withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. UNSCR 1244 outlined UN requirements for intervening in Kosovo to provide security and humanitarian assistance. They included:

An immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo; the withdrawal of the military, police and paramilitary forces of the Federal Republic; deployment of effective international and security presences, with

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<sup>46</sup> Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal, Swanger, Timilsina. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 111.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 111.

<sup>48</sup> NATO's Role in Kosovo, 1999. Available from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>. Accessed 9 NOV 2004.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.



substantial NATO participation in the security presence and unified command and control; establishment of an interim administration; the safe and free return of all refugees; a political process providing for substantial self-government, as well as the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); and a comprehensive approach to the economic development of the crisis region<sup>51</sup>

This set the stage for a NATO-led ground force intervention in the summer of 1999.

The specific security tasks required of KFOR were: to stop the fighting in Kosovo and prevent its resurgence; ensure the withdrawal, and prevent the return of Serbian military and paramilitary forces; demilitarize the KLA; establish a secure environment for return of displaced personnel; ensure public safety and supervising demining; monitor the border; and protect own and international civil activity freedom of movement.<sup>52</sup>

## Execution

KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 with 50,000 troops. NATO divided Kosovo into four regions administered respectively by the US, France, Great Britain and Germany. During the activation and deployment of KFOR into Kosovo, many unforeseen circumstances occurred. First the MTO and UNSCR required Yugoslav military forces to withdraw immediately from Kosovo, and this resulted initially in a security vacuum, since most of the police force was Serb. In the security vacuum between the Yugoslav forces leaving and the establishment of an interim administration under UNMIK, KLA members installed themselves of positions of authority and later had to be removed.<sup>53</sup> Second, entering Kosovo to protect the Albanian from Serb oppression, KFOR and UNMIK found that the most difficult task was protecting the minority Serbs from Albanian retribution.<sup>54</sup> Additionally, during the deployment, a Russian force moved unexpectedly into sector and seized the Pristina airport. This situation initially caused great

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<sup>51</sup>Ibid

<sup>52</sup>Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal, Swanger, Timilsina. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 115.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid, 113.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid, 117.



consternation to General Wesley Clark, Regional Combatant Commander of EUCOM, and military commanded of NATO. He later rectified by allowing a Russian contingent to serve under US, but not NATO control.<sup>55</sup>

The first priority of KFOR was to provide a stable and secure environment and demobilize the KLA. Since most Serbs left with the Yugoslav forces, the remaining, and now significantly the minority, Serbs were subject to terrorist-type attacks from the ethnic majority. This initially proved difficult since the Serbs also spurned initial attempts by KFOR to secure these small Serbian enclaves.<sup>56</sup> Simultaneously, when KFOR began demilitarizing the KLA, they identified that several thousand disenfranchised and unemployed young men and women could prove dangerous in such an unstable environment. To remedy this, they established the Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK). KFOR used this unit in a support role similar to US National Guard unit conducting CONUS disaster relief (disaster response, search and rescue, assistance to demining, distribution of humanitarian aid) but had no role in defense, security, or law enforcement.<sup>57</sup>

In establishing a stable and secure environment, KFOR initially assumed police duties. After several months, they turned this mission over to United States Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) police forces, UN-sponsored civilian police forces that volunteered for service under the auspices of the UN. KFOR NATO forces at that point transitioned to border security, prevention of smuggling, area security and escort of Serb enclaves and personnel and continued demilitarization of Albanian armed groups. As KFOR forces were doing this, UNMIK-P also began training the new Kosovo Police Service (KPS), indigenous police who greatly assisted in providing localized security and law enforcement.

In addition to UNMIK-P forces, many nations volunteered services of paramilitary police forces or Military Specialized Units (MSU). These units, such as the French Gendarmerie, Italian

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 117.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 118.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 117.



Carabinieri and Spanish Guardia, were essentially heavily armed police, specially trained at riot control, search and seizure, and similar tasks. These forces were able to effectively fill security requirements between local civilian police and conventional military forces.<sup>58</sup>

## Security Lessons Learned

Using the Operational Net Assessment (ONA) to evaluate the environment and lessons learned in post-MCO operations, the PMSEII components of political, military, social, and economic stand out as significant in post-MCO Kosovo.

Under political and military components, the security force originally envisioned by the UN to secure Post –MCO Kosovo was the UNMIK-P civilian police forces. These forces negated the necessity, such as in Panama, to create an indigenous responsible police force in a short amount of time. However, slow mobilization of civilian elements in peace operations can be costly, resulting in a security vacuum with repercussions again similar to post-MCO Panama. This vacuum was offset by KFOR. UNSCR 1244 gave KFOR the authority to promulgate law and order pending UNMIK’s capacity to assume responsibility.<sup>59</sup>

A second effective military component from Kosovo was the effectiveness of Special mission units (SMU). The paramilitary organizations of specially trained and armed police provided the combat power of conventional forces, and the specialized law enforcement of police. They performed admirably in Kosovo, performing duties very similar to the US Constabulary in post WW II Germany.

A social/economic component from this post-MCO environment was the effective demobilization/militarization of the KLA. Demobilization of KLA was tied to establishment of job opportunities for those Albanians agreeing to turn in their arms and demilitarize. In response to individual commitment to peace, they were afforded the opportunity to join the Kosovo

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 120.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 127-128.



Protection Corps, an organization dedicated to disaster relief and search and rescue. This program significantly reduced security issues in the region, and promoted psychological good will by providing a salary to disenfranchised fighters.<sup>60</sup>

## Case Study Analysis

PMSEII analysis shows that while the post-MCO environment of these four conflicts varied widely, some trends applied throughout. Variance in future conflicts will most likely continue, as well as the high probability that these trends will pertain also. Prevalent in all post-MCO environments, and supported by PMSEII examples from the case studies, are post-MCO trends of:

- A rise of black-market activities (economic)
- A requirement to provide, or assist in the provision of basic resources of survival (political, military, social, economic)
- Post-MCO retribution by those disenfranchised by the overthrown regime or government (social)
- Extensive provision of US humanitarian and economic reconstruction assistance (political, economic, infrastructure)
- A security vacuum immediately following MCO (political, military)
- Failing to re-integrate demobilized military or para-military forces into the civilian population can create significant seeds of discontent (military, social, economic)
- Military capabilities to provide humanitarian, governmental, and reconstruction assistance are far greater and quicker than other US and international government agencies. (political, military, economic, infrastructure, information)

It is illogical to assume that detailed planning and preparation for post-MCO environments can completely erase the possibility of the above effects. Most likely they will happen in future post-MCO environments. It is logical, however, to conclude that planning to deal with these effects can lessen their severity. This conclusion can be expressed in the simple equation of

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<sup>60</sup>Ibid, 127.



$$\frac{\text{NEGATIVE EFFECT}}{\text{APPLICATION OF PLANNING AND RESOURCES TO THE POST-MCO ENVIRONMENT}} = \text{SEVERITY OF NEGATIVE EFFECT}$$

**Figure 1-Post MCO Planning Factors**

To support this conclusion using the evaluated case studies, one simply needs to choose an effect, examine the resources and planning applies to address it, and examine the resulting scenario. For example, the severity of the negative effect of a post-MCO security vacuum differed significantly in Germany than Panama. Extensive planning by military and civilian intellectuals in a completely mobilized United States, an occupation force of 1.5 million soldiers, and the creation of a specially trained 35,000 man constabulary force resulted in a relatively secure Germany at the cessation of MCO. Panama, on the other hand, suffered extensive economic hardship as a result of the security vacuum at the conclusion of MCO operations. The commitment of only 15,000 US soldiers, mostly untrained in occupation-type duties, and ad-hoc post-MCO planning led to a greater overall negative effect within the region.

While this case study analysis shows that all post-MCO scenarios are not similar, some effects in the post-MCO environment are inevitable. Proper planning for these contingencies can greatly reduce the severity of negative effects. A US Army security framework for planning is a start. This, along with its flexible application in military operations should result in a more secure post-MCO environment.

## **Review and Analysis of US Army Doctrine and the Doctrine Development Process**

### **Existing Doctrine**

Existing U.S. Army doctrine does little to specifically define the period of post-MCO operations and the security required to accomplish it effectively. Security, as defined by doctrinal



manuals, focuses almost entirely on protection and early warning to Army forces and assets during major combat operations. Post-MCO security operations are now generally relegated into stability operations and support operations, which are focused primarily upon providing stability to failing states, interventions to stop regional conflicts, or assist reconstruction in the event of a natural or man-made catastrophe.

The US Army doctrine currently defines security as a broad concept that includes protecting one's own forces, lines of communications, and lines of supply during MCO. FM 1-02 (21 September 2004) *Operational Terms and Graphics*, the US Army doctrinal dictionary, defines security as "1. Measures taken by a military unit, or installation to protect it against all acts designed to, or that may impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences."<sup>61</sup> This document further defines security operations as "Those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force."<sup>62</sup> FM 1-02 also defines Area Security as "A form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installation routes, and actions within a specific area."<sup>63</sup> None of these definitions effectively define security in a post-MCO environment. In this environment, security should also extend to the civilian infrastructure, populace, relief organizations, and assets required for reconstruction activities.

FM 3-0, (June 2001) *Operations* is the capstone US Army doctrinal manual. This document defines the overall purpose of US Army forces as well as defining the operational link between strategic policymaking and tactical execution. More importantly, it provides a

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<sup>61</sup> US Department of the Army. *FM 1 -02, Operational Terms and Graphics*. (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 180.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 180.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, 24.



framework to address the relation of combat and non-combat operations. Rather than viewing MCO operations as separate from post-MCO operations, it defines them as a broad spectrum of combinations of offensive, defensive, stability and support operations. This is exemplified in its purpose that identifies “warfighting as the Army’s primary focus and recognizes that the ability of Army forces to dominate land warfare also provides the ability to dominate any situation in military operations other than war.”<sup>64</sup> While this framework makes sense, the FM does not effectively support its concept when discussing post-conflict operations. In chapter 6, conducting Full Spectrum Operations, it describes post-MCO operations as the

Period of postconflict activities exist[ing] between the end of a conflict and redeployment of the last U.S. soldier...Army forces conduct stability operations and support operations to sustain the results achieved by the campaign. These operations ensure that the threat does not resurrect itself and the conditions that generated the conflict do not recur. Postconflict stability operations and support operations-conducted by Army forces-transform temporary battlefield successes into lasting strategic results.<sup>65</sup>

This statement thus describes post-MCO security and transition operations only as stability and support operations, versus a combination including combat operations. And while it briefly describes stability operations as a way to “help restore law and order in unstable areas outside of the US and its territories” and a way to “provide a secure environment that allows civil authorities to reassume control,”<sup>66</sup> it assumes that these activities begin in a Kosovo or Bosnia-like intervention (US forces not involved in the major combat operations, and deploy only after combat operations cease) versus a US Army transition from a MCO to post-MCO environment.

FM 3-90 (JUL 2000), provides a common discussion of how commanders from the battalion task force level through the corps echelon conduct tactical offensive and defensive operations and their supporting tactical enabling operations. It provides a slightly more descriptive definition of security in its term area security. It states the purpose of Area Security is

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<sup>64</sup> US Department of the Army. *FM 3-0, Operations*. (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), VII.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid*, 6-21 to 6-22.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, 9-5 to 9-6.



to “protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area.”<sup>67</sup> This manual also identifies that “these installations can also be part of the sustaining base or they can constitute part of the area's infrastructure.”<sup>68</sup>

While this manual identifies the need to secure infrastructure beyond that of the US Army, it is woefully inadequate in identifying important external infrastructure, how to secure it, or specific security actions to take when transitioning from MCO to a post-MCO environment. Again, its focus is mostly on ways to secure US Army forces and their rear areas and lines of communications. This is exemplified by FM 3-90's discussion of *transitions*, or “when the commander makes the assessment that he must change from one type of military operation to another... A lull in combat operations often accompanies transition. Civilians may present themselves to friendly forces during this period. The commander must consider how he will minimize the interference of these civilians with his military operations while protecting the civilians from future hostile action. He must also consider the threat they pose to his force and its operations.”<sup>69</sup>

FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, published in 2003, describes in more detail some of the security actions that should take place in post-MCO environments, but not to the level of detail required. In this document, stability operations are described as operations to “promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and informational dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.”<sup>70</sup> Support

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<sup>67</sup> US Department of the Army, “FM 3-90 Tactics,” (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001) 12-1.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, 12-31.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, 3-50 to 3-51.

<sup>70</sup> US Department of the Army, “FM 3-07 Stability operations and Support Operations,” (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003) glossary-14.



operations “assist civil authorities in response to emergencies (natural and man-made) or specified illegal activities, and to relieve or reduce suffering.”<sup>71</sup>

Interestingly, security guidance in this document often contradicts itself. In its discussion on possible decisive operations in support operations, the FM correctly lists "providing security for personnel, facilities, or capabilities; rendering certain services to populations; or reestablishing critical infrastructure." <sup>72</sup> Later, when applying the principles of war to SASO, security considerations focuses only on force protection and US force complacency; versus security of a transition state’s economic infrastructure, personnel, interim governmental agencies, means of reconstruction as well as nongovernmental relief organizations (NGOs).<sup>73</sup> Since stability operations and support operations were envisioned to cover all operations other than MCO, considerations contained within the document are organized as separate entities, versus the combined security framework necessitated by a transition from MCO to post-MCO environment. Bottom line, FM 3-07 does not correctly describe or address post-MCO security operations

Lastly, FM 3-93, *Army in Theater Operations*, correctly describes the environment when transitioning from MCO to post-MCO operations in its statement:

The Army doctrine for full spectrum operations acknowledges that there generally will be no clear division between the conduct of various types of operations. Instead there is a continuum where the US maintains or reestablishes order, stability, and local government at the conclusion of hostilities, and then deters foreign groups from resuming hostile actions while the US and international community takes steps to establish or restore the conditions necessary for long term stability...Successfully imposing our national will on an enemy whose actions caused the US to engage him in combat may well rest on what the land force component does after the joint force destroys his capability to resist.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>71</sup>Ibid, 1-6.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid, 1-14.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid, 1-22.

<sup>74</sup> US Department of the Army, “FM 3-93 Army in Theater Operations,” (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003) 2-25.



Though this statement correctly describes the difficulty in transitioning from MCO to post-MCO operations, it does not provide enough detail of what specific security operations must be undertaken to stabilize a region, prevent the resurgence of further violence, and pave the way for reconstruction activities and eventual autonomy of the nation in which our military has intervened.

FM 41-10 *Civil Affairs Operations*, published February 2000, define CMO as “the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and nongovernment civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives.”<sup>75</sup> This document provides some useful information dealing with coordination with civilian forces during stability and support operations. Specifically, it briefly discusses Civil Affairs’ role in the demobilization of resistance forces, coordination with host nation governments and militaries, functions of Civil Military Operation Centers (CMOC), and assistance during transition operations. Unfortunately, this document does little to address security issues during transition operations, nor does it discuss much outside the realm of Civil Affairs.

## **Emerging Doctrine**

Recent draft documents have begun to address the concerns of some possible post-MCO environments. Draft FM I 3-07.22 (Counterinsurgency Operations) is a manual focused on Division level and below fundamentals of military operations in a counterinsurgency environment. Many of the principles and guidance contained in this document apply in the post-MCO security environment. The FM posits that in addition to the normal base security requirements present in most SASO environments, “some tasks occur with greater frequency in

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<sup>75</sup> US Department of the Army, FM 41-40 “Civil Military Operations,” (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002) 1-1.



COIN and deserve special attention. Among these are: military operations primarily in cities, protection of government facilities, protection of infrastructure, protection of commercial enterprises vital to the HN economy, protection of cultural facilities, prevention of looting, Military Police functions, close interaction with civilians, assistance with reconstruction projects, securing the HN borders, [and] training or retraining HN military forces.”<sup>76</sup>

This superb analysis, though very insightful and applicable in contemporary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, apply to a very specific scenario, that of a counterinsurgency. Generally, if this event occurs in a post-MCO environment, it is a result of failure to conduct an effective transition from hostilities to post-hostilities. While this doctrine is necessary, what is needed is specific security guidance, in the form of a graduated security framework, which allows a quick transition to a secure environment, thus allowing quick restoration of a safe and secure environment, restoration of basic services, and a the establishment of a viable government friendly to the interests of the world and the US.

## Findings

Overall, US Army doctrine on the requirements for a successful post-MCO security environment is lacking. Current doctrine focuses on US Army-centric security versus security also of host-nation infrastructure. Current SASO doctrine focuses on interventions wherein non-US entities have concluded MCO prior to US involvement. Civil Affairs operations discuss transition operations, but only from the limited view of CA. Emerging doctrine discusses effective security considerations but only in a COIN scenario. Overall, the detailed requirements necessary for effective planning at the operational and tactical level to initiate effective security tasks are absent.

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<sup>76</sup> US Department of the Army, “Draft FM Interim 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations,” Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004) 2-1-2-2.



Several conditions have led to the lack of a comprehensible post-MCO security doctrine. First, US Army doctrine development is time consuming and often disorganized. Changes in capstone documents trigger subsequent changes in supporting documents. As a result, changes are continual and often overlapping, producing a continual state of flux in doctrine. Thus, lessons learned in Iraq may take several years before they are addressed in all updated field manuals. Additionally, much of US Army doctrine is not synchronized with the doctrine of other sister services. As a result, a Department of Defense directive announced the requirement to develop all service component doctrine in accordance with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) developed joint doctrine. JFCOM is currently developing these joint concepts, based upon effects based operations (EBO). As these concepts are developed and tested, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is attempting to concurrently develop corresponding and complementing doctrine. Unfortunately, this wait for the development of joint doctrine by JFCOM has resulted in a time lag, preventing updated US Army doctrine publication. Also, US Army doctrine simply does not address the post-MCO operations that our military experienced in Iraq. Post-MCO operations are often simply listed as an addendum to major combat operations, or not addressed at all.

What is needed to fix these shortcoming is capstone post-MCO doctrinal manuals at the interagency, joint, operational and tactical level. This document would influence all supporting doctrinal material, allow synchronization with sister services, and ensure that post-MCO operations are planned and resourced to the same level of fidelity as major combat operations. In this manual, doctrine writers should combine the security framework for post-MCO operations with other considerations such as political, humanitarian, economic, social and informational tasks and desired effects in the post-MCO environment. While this process may be time consuming and labor intensive, it is necessary to prepare future leaders for future contingencies.



## Conclusion

Three general conclusions can be drawn from the analysis in this monograph. First, history and lessons learned from previous conflicts can help inform the reader of common trends in the post-MCO environment, provide possible ways to mitigate negative effects, and lead to the establishment of a security framework and doctrine for post-MCO operations. Second, the current US Army doctrinal development process is laborious and ineffective. Third, current doctrine does not adequately address Post-MCO security operations.

Lessons learned from previous conflicts provide the basics of a security framework for post-MCO operations. Several general conclusions emerge upon the analysis of these conflicts. Post conflict operations primarily involve the military initially, especially in establishing a stable security environment. The mission of the US Army is to “fight and win our nation’s wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of combatant commanders.”<sup>77</sup> Other inter-agency and non-governmental agencies generally will not assume responsibility for reconstruction of a region until that region is stable and secure and not pose a significant risk to their well-being. Thus it falls to the military to conduct MCO operations, conclude them, and rapidly transition to reconstruction primarily through establishing security and the initial provision of basic needs of the populace.

For the indigenous population, a return to any sense of normalcy depends on the provision of security. Scott Feil in his article, *Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction* states this very succinctly when he states, “refugee and internally displaced persons will wait until they feel safe to go home; former combatants will wait until they feel safe to lay down their arms and reintegrate into civilian life or a legitimate, restructured military organization; farmers and merchants will wait until they feel that fields, roads, and

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<sup>77</sup> [www.army.mil](http://www.army.mil), accessed 9 NOV 2004.



markets are safe before engaging in food production and business activity; and parents will wait until they feel safe to send their children to school, tend to their families, and seek economic opportunities.”<sup>78</sup>

Failure to re-integrate or find alternative sources of income or alternative activity for indigenous military and security forces will create a large disenfranchised group, which may cause future instability through insurgency. This is “one of the most pressing and recurring challenges to any postconflict situation. Failure to respond to this problem adequately and to promote combatants' incorporation into a legitimate security organization...leads to long term difficulties across all areas of reconstruction.”<sup>79</sup> It is unrealistic to believe we can immediately re-employ the entire population and create thousands of additional jobs for the demobilized military. However, historical interim solutions exist. Solutions such as the Kosovo Protection Corps in the Kosovo intervention or the Civilian Conservation Corps, an employment program developed by President Roosevelt as part of his “New Deal” Program during the Great Depression, did much to assuage the concern of a father or husband facing the prospects of unemployment.

Post-MCO intelligence requirements are different than MCO intelligence requirements. Rather than focus on enemy formations and terrain, which facilitate decisive military operations, units must now focus on infrastructure and populace control in an effort to facilitate a quicker transition to reconstruction. Managing this transition and its subsequent influx of information foreign to most MCO-trained operators requires a disciplined and innovative staff. This analysis should “address political, economic, linguistic, religious, demographic, ethnic, psychological, and legal factor. The sources of information will be non-traditional a and include open sources such

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<sup>78</sup>Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction,”100.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid, 104.



as commercial ventures, travel agencies, clergy, and international organizations and nongovernmental organizations that have been engaged in the area.”<sup>80</sup>

Post-MCO security operations will begin while MCO continues elsewhere. Budgetary constraints, increased capabilities, and deployment and time limitations require forces to conduct operational campaigns over time and space. Combat forces will complete MCO and then move to a different location to continue operations. The subsequent security vacuum must be addressed or prevented to minimize theft, damage, and losses to the indigenous populace and state infrastructure and to allow a quicker transition to post-MCO reconstruction by military, interagency and NGO assets.

Future operations will have a short MCO followed by a long reconstruction period. The US Army MCO capabilities are unmatched throughout the world. Its capabilities in both kinetic and non-kinetic means as well as methods of delivery allow it to quickly dominate adversary combat formations. Unfortunately, a by-product of this is possible damage to important infrastructure in the area of operations. This is true even in the “effects based” targeting system, which attempts to minimize collateral damage. The reconstruction of this damaged or destroyed infrastructure is both time and monetarily consuming. Additionally, historical hindsight supports this statement. The most effective post-MCO reconstruction missions undertaken by US and multinational forces are those that show a continued presence over time. Germany and Japan both continued well over ten years; Kosovo and Bosnia are quickly approaching this benchmark.

Finally, US Army deployment and MCO capabilities enable it to act much faster than other interagency, non-governmental, or international organizations. As evidenced by the sprint up-country and quick regime-toppling by US forces in the MCO portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom, these operations outstripped the ability of our national authority to focus additional interagency assets which could ease the transition period following MCO. Perhaps in the future

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<sup>80</sup>Flavin, William. “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-conflict Success.” (*Parameters* (Autumn 2003) 6.



we should create more time for other elements of national power to deploy, arrive, prepare and assist in our operations.

The current doctrinal development process is ineffective. Changes in doctrinal manuals necessitate constant flux in supporting manuals, all resulting in a time consuming and non-responsive application of lessons learned. Our doctrine currently fails to support our sister services or adequately address interagency coordination.

Most importantly, current US Army doctrine fails to provide clear guidance on post-MCO security operations. The majority of field manuals discuss security only from an aspect of protection to US forces during MCO operations. These documents fail to adequately consider the repercussions if the host-nation or indigenous population and infrastructure are also not secured. Failure to accomplish this will most likely result in a longer reconstruction period and possible insurgency such as that currently ongoing in Iraq. Current doctrine also fails to address how to effectively transition from MCO to post-MCO operations.

## **Recommendations**

US Army doctrine must address security in a post-MCO environment. Before defining these tasks and effects, we must make two major assumptions for future scenarios. These assumptions are that other forces must assist in the execution of these tasks/ effects to enable a completely secure environment and planning for these tasks/ effects begins by using an Operational Net Assessment (ONA) approach.

Joint, multinational and interagency assets must assist with post-MCO security tasks/ effects to ensure a completely secure environment. Two considerations support the feasibility of this assumption. First, significant forces are required to accomplish all recommended post-MCO security tasks/ effects. For an example, a post-MCO scenario in Iran would require 690,000 personnel dedicated to security if one assumes the necessity of one peacekeeper per 100 indigenous persons. This corresponds to one soldier or policeman for each 2.4 square kilometer.



Significant about this number is that it does not include the required support personnel. Granted, many scenarios may allow economy of force missions by isolating threats, such as post-WWII Japan, but troop requirements are still high. Second, if only US Army ground forces are committed to the accomplishment of these tasks/ effects, it will result in a significantly-sized force committed for an undetermined amount of time, thus “strategically fixing” our forces. These forces are then unable to redeploy and refit in preparation for contingency operations in other locations.

Second, the planning for these tasks and effects must use an Operational Net Assessment approach. ONA is the:

Integration of people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build shared knowledge of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves... These products identify leverage points, key nodes and links that we can act upon to influence... the adversary’s behavior, capabilities, perceptions, and decision-making.<sup>81</sup>

Thus geographic combatant commanders, service component commanders, and tactical units deploying to contingency locations can understand the “systems of systems” of the region, and gain a better understanding of the important political, military, social, economic, information, and infrastructure leverage points, nodes and links. While this “system of systems” may radically change during MCO operations, the ONA approach provides enough information for effective post-MCO initial planning. Some nodes significant to post-MCO security operations may include, but are not limited to: specific personnel, equipment or locations possibly utilized by terrorist forces to incite insurgency situations; locations of military stockpiles; locations of prisons; infiltration routes into the region from adjacent threat states, locations of key life supporting, governmental and communication infrastructure

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<sup>81</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment (ONA) (24 FEB 2004, Suffolk, VA) 23.



## Post-MCO Security Framework

The below-listed tasks and effects meet general security requirements in a post-MCO environment. They are grouped into two different level of priority. Priority One tasks/effects must be accomplished as soon as possible or in some cases simultaneous with MCO operations. Priority Two tasks/effects, while no less important, require more time and assistance from other agencies. The table listed in figure 1 encapsulates the overall security tasks as well as the desired effects to accomplish in the post-MCO environment.

Priority 1 Tasks	Effect	Priority 2 Tasks	Effect
Isolate/ eliminate resistance	Prevent insurgency	Military/ security/ paramilitary demobilization	Prevent insurgency or coup
Secure infrastructure/ economic assets/ national treasures	Prevent destruction by rioting, looting, theft	Security from external nation, countries, influences	Prevent insurgency or black market activities
Removal/justice for regime leaders, local threat party-members, troublemakers	Prevent reoccurrence of actions contrary to US and/or world political and security objectives		
Capture/ accountability/ possible destruction of weapons and weapons materials	Enable safe/secure environment, prevent insurgency		
Establish basic law and order	Reassure public		
Regulate and protect movement of own, NGO, governmental authority	Relieve suffering, enable establishment of new government		
Secure the means of basic needs of the populace	Relieve suffering, prevent humanitarian crisis		
Secure prisons	Enable safe/ secure environment, facilitate release of friendly POWs/ political prisoners		

**Figure 2-Post-MCO Security Task/Effect Martrix**

**Quickly isolate/ eliminate resistance.** The first priority of all US Army forces is to remove the most probable threat from the environment. Threat may include enemy conventional forces, paramilitary forces, non-state terrorists or local thugs attempting to establish control in a non-regime environment. Army forces should use both high-tech (UAV, SIGINT, ELINT),



HUMINT, as well as conventional RISTA means to identify these threats. Building a rapport with the local populace is paramount to successful identification of these forces. Upon identification of threat forces, army forces must evaluate their threat to the security environment and either capture, destroy, or isolate them. Due to high manpower and specialized capability requirements, a significant portion of combat power must be identified and trained to conduct this successfully (example: US Constabulary in Post-WW II Germany).

**Secure infrastructure/economic assets/national treasures.** A nation's infrastructure (governmental, security, medical, power and water producing capability), economic capability (factories, ports, warehouses, sources of raw materials, transportation networks), and national treasures (museums, architecture, churches, monuments) are all threatened in MCO (due to conventional attack) and post-MCO (due to rioting or looting) environments. These assets are important since they are necessary to provide basic needs to the populace, allow a quicker transition to a peaceful environment, support economic self-sufficiency, decrease required external economic and humanitarian aid, and protect assets valuable and irreplaceable to a nation's identity. When possible, locations of these assets should be provided to occupying forces. In lieu of this, site-surveys, with the assistance of credible indigenous personnel, must be quickly undertaken to identify these assets. The number of these assets may quickly overwhelm the security capability of US Army forces. If this is the case, consideration must be given to the temporary hiring of US screened and supervised indigenous personnel to assist in this security requirement. Additionally, commander's, with the assistance of local authority figures (friendly mayors, clergy, heads of households) must convince workers to return to work and re-establish basic needs (water, electricity, food production).

**Capture/accountability/possible destruction of WMDs and conventional weapons.** Given the recent availability of weapons of mass destruction, as well as their increased threat of use by threat regimes or non-state terrorists, army forces must quickly identify and secure them. This prevents their local use and also denies their movement into the hands of international



terrorists. Conventional weapons must also be identified, inventoried and in some cases destroyed. Commanders must weigh local customs (example Afghanistan-all adult males generally carry a weapon) against his own security requirements when deciding to what level disarmament must occur. At a minimum, all weapons should be inventoried in order to identify possible perpetrators of future acts of violence. Methods to collect and/or identify weapons are diverse and include decrees through local indigenous authority figures and weapon buy-back programs through cordon and search operations. Stockpiles of weapons should be screened to identify fully mission capable small arms. These are retained and safeguarded for future use by indigenous security personnel. Remaining weapons should be destroyed to prevent their future use by threat forces.

**Removal/justice for regime leaders, local threat party members, troublemakers.**

Those regime leaders directly responsible for the actions leading to US intervention must be quickly captured both to prevent a future insurgency situation and to convince the general indigenous populace that the rule by him/her is officially over. As soon as possible, these regime leaders must be tried by international or re-established local judicial authorities if they are suspected of war crimes. This adds legitimacy to the on-going intervention operation. Local governments must be purged of hard-line threat party members. Commanders must weigh the disruption of local government by a thorough purge versus consideration of how deeply inculcated local government members are to threat party beliefs. In many cases, personnel may be members of a threat party or regime out of necessity (threat to self and family, means of employment) and in reality significantly disagree with the party line. Lastly, opportunists may attempt to take power in an effort to forward his/her own political views or to seek an economic opportunity. Commanders must weigh these troublemaker's objectives against that of their mission, security of their forces, and the needs of the indigenous populace and take prompt action to remove them from positions of authority.



**Establishment of basic law and order.** Establishing a safe and secure environment is the quickest way reassure the local populace. Failure to accomplish this may lead to indigenous personnel turning against US and coalition occupiers, judging them directly responsible for threats to their families, means of employment and property. Actions as simple as presence patrols, constant contact with the local populace, providing internment facilities, and providing prompt and effective actions against criminal activity define some ways to maintain a safe and secure environment. Establishing this environment can quickly lead to local resumption of day-to-day activities, thus ensuring the provision of basic needs and preventing feelings of disenfranchisement through inactivity.

**Regulate, protect, and ensure movement of own, NGO, governmental authority.** Paramount to successful transition and reconstruction activities is safe and quick movement of US military, NGO, and government assets (both interagency and indigenous interim). Ensured movement allows effective and prompt delivery of humanitarian relief, reconstruction supplies and equipment, quick security responses to criminal or threat activity, and a way for the local populace to return to jobs. Security presence on transportation routes are more effective than escort operations, since a constant presence discourages the used of improvised explosive devices, mines, and ambushes by threat forces.

**Secure the means of basic needs of the populace.** Paramount to the reconstruction and eventual autonomous rule by indigenous personnel is the ability of initial occupation forces to ensure that the populace's basic needs are met. Similar to providing a safe and secure environment, failure to provide these needs may lead to indigenous distrust and eventual animosity toward US occupiers. Primary basic needs are sources of clean water, food, medical care and shelter. Additional needs are communication, transportation and means of employment. In the best-case scenario, most of these sources are undamaged and US forces must simply provide security for them. Realistically, all or some of these sources are destroyed. As a result, commanders must prioritize what needs are provided via Army channels (examples, providing



ROWPU capability for fresh water, generators for power, medical supplies to indigenous medical clinics), securing additional means via NGO support, and identifying requirements for reconstruction as well as beginning repairs within army capabilities.

**Prison security.** Initial security of prisons serves three major purposes. First, historically, threat regime leaders have released dangerous prisoners in an effort to counter US and Allied operations; quick seizure of these prisons may prevent this trend in the future. Second, quick seizure allows accelerated release of political prisoner or friendly prisoners of war. Lastly, prison security also prevents damage to the prison due to rioting or looting, thus preserving its use for reestablishing regional security.

**Military /security apparatus/ paramilitary or militia demobilization.**

Demobilization is defined either as complete disintegration or a purge of potential threat leadership and personnel while retaining remaining forces as part of a new military or police apparatus. The commander must consider the ramifications of complete dissolution and the possible creation of an insurgency-prone environment by creating a large, disenfranchised and unemployed population. Counter to this is possibly creating a questionable indigenous security force, prone to desertion, OPSEC challenges, and of questionable authority in the eyes of the general populace. If forces are retained, they will most likely require additional training and equipping. Police forces will require law enforcement training. Of the utmost consideration is this force's perception by the indigenous population. If they were previously viewed as thuggish, corrupt, and ill disciplined, then significant effort must be made to re-legitimize the new force by way of joint US-new indigenous force patrols and operations, significant training in "protect and serve" mentality, a sustained IO campaign, and new uniforms.

**Security from external nation, countries, influences.** External nations or non-state actors may try to take advantage of a post-MCO environment to start resistance movements against US and coalition reconstruction activities. They may also simply be seeking economic opportunity by way of looting or seizing infrastructure or natural resources. Thus border crossing



site and general border security serve to prevent these influences from entering, prevent threat personnel from leaving, and also discourage smuggling and black marketeering.

## **Final Thoughts**

In conclusion, effective security effects in post-MCO operations are integral to achieving the end-state in military operations. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan show the difficulty in establishing an effective security environment, as well as some of the ramifications for not doing so. US Army doctrine tends to focus almost completely on MCO operations, rather than focusing on winning the peace afterwards. Looking back through history, we find a rich history of post-MCO security techniques; some effective (Germany, Japan), some generally ineffective (Panama), some still undetermined (Kosovo, Bosnia). Regardless of their perceived success or failure, each can be learned from for possible application in contemporary or future conflicts, as examples of what or what not to do.

This monograph specifically examined four post-MCO scenarios (post WWII Germany, post-WWII Japan, Panama, Kosovo) and from them gleaned operational net assessment PMSEII lessons learned. This study next examined contemporary and emerging doctrine to determine shortfalls in the area of post-MCO security. It concluded with the identification of eleven security priorities to be accomplished during or as soon as possible following termination of post-MCO operations to achieve effects in accordance with Effects Based Operations. These effects, if accomplished would greatly assist in the introduction of a secure environment, thus allowing reconstruction to begin.

Most importantly, this is not a conclusion, but a beginning. Additional considerations of on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan must be applied when determining security requirements. Hopefully, this monograph will be a source of information and ideas of further research into this and other areas.



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## Appendix A

### Post- WWII Germany

<p>Summation of Plan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Martial Law (military governances)</li><li>• Comprehensive occupation by 1.5 million American soldiers</li><li>• Significant infrastructure security</li><li>• Formation of US Constabulary for paramilitary capability</li><li>• Complete demobilization of German military forces</li><li>• Complete disarming of populace</li><li>• Local commander authority to emplace/ remove indigenous administrative personnel</li><li>• Phased implementation of post-MCO occupation plan</li><li>• Security of NGOs assisting reconstruction</li><li>• US military assumed primary responsibility for initial humanitarian/ reconstruction activities</li></ul>
<p>Level of Planning and Coordination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Extensive, began four years prior to implementation</li><li>• Coordination simplified by use of martial law and military governances (reduced IA coordination)</li></ul>
<p>Issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Lengthy Occupation</li><li>• Extensive damage to infrastructure caused disruption of basic needs</li><li>• Extensive reconstruction effort required significant economic assistance</li><li>• Large numbers of unemployed men resulting from military demobilization</li><li>• Rise of black market</li><li>• Initial governmental/ security vacuum prior to piecemeal implementation of occupation plan</li><li>• Security required to prevent retribution on populace/ infrastructure by formerly imprisoned/ displaced personnel</li></ul>



## Post-WWII Japan

<p>Summation of Plan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Retain Emperor as head of state</li><li>• Indigenous civilian governances with US military oversight (military government teams)</li><li>• Primarily urban occupation by 200k American and British soldiers</li><li>• Isolate vs. search and destroy operations to neutralize guerrillas</li><li>• Japanese military-assisted demobilization of forces</li><li>• Complete disarming of populace</li><li>• Secure government infrastructure</li><li>• US military assumed primary responsibility for initial humanitarian/ reconstruction activities</li><li>• Provide security for NGO relief agencies</li><li>• Train and equip a Japanese national police force (late 1940s)</li></ul>
<p>Level of Planning and Coordination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• At political-strategic level, began four years prior to implementation.</li><li>• Received by GEN Macarthur only weeks prior to his implementation</li><li>• Coordination complicated by necessity to use existing indigenous government</li></ul>
<p>Issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Lengthy Occupation</li><li>• Extensive damage to infrastructure caused disruption of basic needs</li><li>• Looting of Japanese warehouses/ stockpile in period between Emperor acknowledgment of defeat and occupation by Allied forces increased humanitarian requirements</li><li>• Extensive reconstruction effort required significant economic assistance</li><li>• Large numbers of unemployed men resulting from military demobilization</li><li>• Rise of black market</li></ul>



## Panama

<p>Summation of Plan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Installation of indigenous civilian government with assistance of US Army Civil-Military Operation specialists</li><li>• Short-term occupation by approx 15K American soldiers</li><li>• Focus on capture of Manuel Noriega</li><li>• Demobilization of PDF and Dignity Battalions</li><li>• Provide a safe/ secure environment (additional task implemented post-MCO)</li><li>• PDF retained/retrained as police force using Department of Justice Assets (additional task implemented post-MCO)</li><li>• Provide escort for NGO relief agencies (additional task implemented post-MCO)</li><li>• Secure economic, governmental, and basic-need infrastructure (additional task implemented post-MCO)</li><li>• Resource initial reconstruction effort (additional task implemented post-MCO)</li></ul>
<p>Level of Planning and Coordination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Plan incomplete prior to implementation</li><li>• Coordination complicated by inter-agency (DOS, DOJ) bureaucracy and indigenous government liaison</li></ul>
<p>Issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Initial security vacuum led to rioting, looting, destruction and vigilantism</li><li>• Extensive damage to infrastructure due to post-MCO rioting caused significant economic hardship to Panamanian economy.</li><li>• Damage to security and governmental infrastructure due to post-MCO rioting increased difficulty of establishing a safe and secure environment.</li><li>• Rise of black market</li><li>• Combat soldiers untrained/ unprepared for post-MCO security and stability operations</li><li>• Initial population distrust of former PDF forces now serving in Panamanian Police Force</li></ul>



## Kosovo

<p>Summation of Plan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Interim Administrative Government (UNMIK) leading to eventual democratic Kosovar elections</li><li>• Occupation by 50K NATO soldiers</li><li>• Enforcement of separation of KLA and Serbian forces</li><li>• Complete demobilization of KLA</li><li>• Establish Kosovo Protection Corps to prevent disenfranchisement of demobilized KLA fighters</li><li>• Establish safe and secure environment</li><li>• Transition police duties to UN police forces</li><li>• Facilitate the safe return of displaced civilians</li><li>• Provide security for NGO relief organizations</li><li>• Extensive utilization of Military Specialized Units for constabulary-type operations</li></ul>
<p>Level of Planning and Coordination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• One year of planning prior to occupation by NATO-led forces</li><li>• Coordination complicated by UN and participating-nation administrative approval</li></ul>
<p>Issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Time requirement to form NATO Task Force combined with quick withdrawal of Serb forces resulted in security vacuum. In this vacuum indigenous forces seized power and later had to be remove.</li><li>• Initial retributions against Serb enclaves by Albanian forces</li><li>• Lengthy occupation (6 years)</li><li>• Extensive damage to infrastructure required significant economic assistance</li><li>• Rise of black-market activities.</li><li>• Time required to mobilize UN-sponsored assistance (UN Mission in Kosovo Police Force required 9 months)</li></ul>